Confirmatory Legislative History by Brudney, James J.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 76
Issue 3
SYMPOSIUM:
Statutory Interpretation: How Much Work Does
Language Do?
Article 1
2011
Confirmatory Legislative History
James J. Brudney
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative History, 76 Brook. L. Rev. (2011).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol76/iss3/1
901 
ARTICLES 
 
Confirmatory Legislative History* 
James J. Brudney† 
INTRODUCTION 
Textualists and intentionalists regularly lock horns over 
the proper approach to construing statutory language regarded 
as inconclusive. The interpretive debate seems less contentious, 
however, when the words of the law are deemed clear. There 
may be reasonable disagreement as to whether the text at issue 
in a particular controversy has a plain meaning, but if it does 
then that meaning arguably preempts further inquiry. Since 
1990, Supreme Court majority opinions are replete with 
declarations such as: “Given [a] straightforward statutory 
command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history”; 1 or 
“we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text 
that is clear”;2 or “[w]hen the words of a statute are 
unambiguous . . . this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial 
inquiry is complete.’”3 
Yet despite these ringing statements, the Court in fact 
often departs from its “first canon” by relying on legislative 
history to confirm or reinforce what it already has concluded is 
the plain meaning of statutory text. On numerous occasions 
  
 * © 2011 James J. Brudney. All rights reserved. 
 † Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State 
University Moritz College of Law, and Visiting Professor of Law, Fordham University 
School of Law, Fall 2010. I am grateful to Larry Baum and Larry Solan for thoughtful 
comments on this draft, to Jimmie Friday, Randy Hart, and Karin Johnsrud for 
valuable research assistance, and to Jen Pursell for fine secretarial support.  
 1 United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997). 
 2 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994); see also Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (quoting Ratzlaf with approval). 
 3 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). 
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since 2006, the Roberts Court has invoked legislative history as 
a confirmatory asset. Six of these majorities, including four 
cases decided during the 2009 term, have drawn sharp rebukes 
from Justice Scalia.4 Beyond expressing his general hostility 
toward legislative history, Justice Scalia has criticized the 
confirmatory use of legislative record evidence as incentivizing 
wasteful research by lawyers.5 He discounts such reliance as a 
misleading makeweight that, although never the real reason 
for a court’s decision, has disturbingly antidemocratic 
implications with respect to the role of judges.6 
This essay takes issue with Justice Scalia’s view of 
confirmatory legislative history. It maintains that persistent 
judicial reliance on such history reflects important shortcomings 
in the textualist approach. When courts move beyond the 
presumptively clear meaning of statutory language, they 
recognize—even if implicitly—that assertions of clarity can too 
often serve as either a mirage or a refuge. Clarity may be a 
mirage because apparently precise words or phrases often give 
rise to conflicting “plain meanings,” and also because apparently 
assured readers of those words or phrases are conditioned to 
perceive clarity based on their own specialized training, 
background, and level of self-confidence. Assertions of clarity 
may serve as a refuge in that they obviate the need for judges to 
provide more complete explanations for their decisions. This 
aspiration for completeness, although not embraced by Justice 
Scalia, is important to many other judges as they seek to explain 
adjudicative resolutions before the diverse audiences to whom 
they are responsive and responsible. 
  
 4 See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2287, 2289 (2010) (Stevens, 
J.); id. at 2293-94 (Scalia, J., concurring); Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2241-
42 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.); id. at 2242 (Scalia, J., concurring); Jerman v. Carlisle, 
McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1615-17 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.); 
id. at 1626-28 (Scalia, J., concurring); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1332 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.); id. at 1341-42 (Scalia, J., 
concurring); United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 275-77 (2008) (Stevens, J.); id. at 
277 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring); Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 500-01 
(2006) (Alito, J.); id. at 509-11 (Scalia, J., concurring). For additional recent majority 
opinions relying on legislative history to confirm or reinforce textual plain meaning, see 
Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1485-90 (2009); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 
Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 16-20 (2006); and Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-93 (2005).  
 5 See, e.g., Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., concurring); Milavetz, 130 
S. Ct. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring); Zedner, 547 U.S. at 510 (Scalia, J, concurring).  
 6 See, e.g., Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2293 (Scalia, J., concurring); Carr, 130 S. 
Ct. at 2242 (Scalia, J., concurring); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1628 (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 
326, 344-45 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-
53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Part I reviews the use of confirmatory legislative history 
and identifies Justice Scalia’s objections. Part II explains why 
judges continue to rely on such history, and how that reliance 
relates to the inadequacies of an overly language-based 
approach to statutory interpretation. 
I. CRITICIZING CONFIRMATORY HISTORY 
The Court’s use of legislative history to corroborate that 
statutory text means what it appears to say is not a recent 
development. Writing in the early 1980s, Judge Patricia Wald 
cited numerous decisions from the 1981 term in which the 
majority analyzed legislative record materials for confirmatory 
purposes.7 As far back as the 1920s, Justice Holmes opined that 
the so-called plain meaning rule was subject to the gloss of 
congressional intent.8 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some 
judges and legal academics expressed concern that legislative 
history might be surpassing statutory language as the 
foundational interpretive asset.9 The rise of textualism, 
consistently championed by Justice Scalia during his twenty-
five years on the Court, has curtailed that trend and restored 
the primacy of enacted text.  
Primacy, however, need not entail exclusivity. Justice 
Scalia’s initial barrage of separate opinions challenging the 
Court’s reliance on legislative history10 included an insistence 
that legislative materials ought to never be invoked to reinforce 
  
 7 See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History 
in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 197-99 (1983) (discussing nine 
examples from a single term). 
 8 Bos. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (“It is said 
that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to evidence in order to 
raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law. . . . If Congress 
has been accustomed to use a certain phrase with a more limited meaning than might 
be attributed to it by common practice it would be arbitrary to refuse to consider that 
fact when we come to interpret a statute.”). 
 9 See Wald, supra note 7, at 200-05 (discussing reservations about the 
reliability, relevance, and thoroughness of various legislative materials); see also REED 
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 164 (1975) (referring 
to “the Canadian gibe that in the United States whenever the legislative history is 
ambiguous it is permissible to refer to the statute”). 
 10 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on 
Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 117, 161 (2008) (discussing twelve Scalia concurrences and dissents written in 
his first three terms). 
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the plain meaning of text.11 Scalia continued to object to 
confirmatory history during the Rehnquist Court years.12 His 
rhetorical intensity—directed at a wide range of colleagues—
remains unabated in the Roberts era.13 
From Justice Scalia’s vantage point, reliance on 
legislative history to confirm plain meaning is unacceptable for 
a number of reasons. Some of these reasons might fairly be 
viewed as deriving from his core position that legislative 
history should be altogether inadmissible as an interpretive 
resource. Thus, Scalia criticizes confirmatory usage as a form of 
“intellectual piling-on [that] has addictive consequences” 
because it acculturates judges to believing that legislative 
history is intrinsically reliable.14 Relatedly, he insists that such 
usage gives rise to a slippery slope: once legislative history is 
deemed relevant to confirm the clear meaning of text, it may be 
considered relevant to question or even contradict that clear 
meaning, “thus rendering what is plain ambiguous.”15 Scalia 
also condemns reliance on confirmatory references, as he does 
reliance in general, for more pragmatic reasons: it effectively 
prescribes “wasteful over-lawyering” at clients’ expense “merely 
for the sake of completeness.”16 
Of particular interest are two other Scalia criticisms 
that identify potentially distinctive problems with the 
confirmatory approach. One involves its allegedly superfluous 
nature. If the text is clear on its face, then confirmatory 
legislative history is by definition duplicative and hence 
entirely unnecessary.17 This redundant role exemplifies how 
“legislative history is almost never the real reason for the 
  
 11 See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371-77 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring); Taylor, 487 U.S. at 344-45 (Scalia, J., concurring); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. at 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 12 See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 267 
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring); Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 
264, 279-83 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 13 The six Roberts-era decisions cited supra note 4 were authored by Justices 
Alito, Stevens, and Sotomayor. The five earlier decisions cited supra notes 11-12 were 
authored by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg. 
 14 Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 510 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 15 Id. at 510-11; see also Taylor, 487 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 16 Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 
1627 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1342 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 17 See, e.g., Intel Corp., 524 U.S. at 267 (Scalia, J., concurring); Bank One, 516 
U.S. at 282-83 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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Court’s decision—and make-weights do not deserve a lot of the 
Court’s time.”18 
The second notable criticism involves the allegedly 
antidemocratic aspects of using confirmatory history. Scalia 
expressed this concern early in his tenure on the Court. 
Emphasizing that the role of judges is to “interpret laws rather 
than reconstruct legislators’ intentions,” he reasoned that 
where the language of the laws is clear, courts are not free to 
consider unenacted intent as a possible supplement or 
replacement.19 If courts allow for the possibility that legislative 
history is capable of altering plain meaning, they foster a 
lawmaking culture in which members of Congress understand 
that they can avoid the arduous work of negotiating and 
enacting a floor amendment for the simpler task of 
promulgating a floor colloquy.20 To encourage such efforts by 
blessing them as potentially probative undermines our 
constitutional democracy. Judges who denigrate or discount the 
challenge of securing approval for statutory language from both 
chambers and the President are effectively promoting a lack of 
political accountability for our elected officials.21 
Each of these two criticisms is rooted in Justice Scalia’s 
commitment to a semantic approach when interpreting 
statutes. His view that ordinary meaning, supplemented by 
structural and language canons, constitutes “the real reason” 
for judicial decisions reflects his confidence that there is a 
single solution to interpretive controversies and that language-
based analysis is all conscientious judges need in order to 
discover it.22 Likewise, Scalia’s objection to the possibility that 
legislative history is available to confirm ordinary meaning 
reflects his conviction that judges undermine their neutral, 
apolitical responsibility as interpreters of Congress’s textual 
  
 18 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2294 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added); see also Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1628 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is 
almost invariably the case that our opinions benefit not at all from the make-weight 
use of legislative history.”).  
 19 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 452, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 20 See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring); see generally Zedner v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509-11 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 21 See Hon. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History be an 
Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 808 (1998). 
 22 Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2294 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Chisom v. 
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing his approach to 
construing statutes: “first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual 
context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any 
clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies”). 
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work product by consulting the politically generated record of 
Congress’s enactment process.  
II. JUSTIFYING CONFIRMATORY HISTORY 
A core premise of Justice Scalia’s textualist philosophy 
is that there is almost invariably a single plain meaning for 
disputed statutory language. He does not expect that this one 
exact meaning will necessarily be obvious or readily perceived, 
but he is prepared to work hard to avoid ambiguity. Toward 
that end, Scalia employs a diverse semantic toolkit for his 
statutory opinions—dictionary definitions, identical words or 
phrases as previously applied in other laws, and multiple 
canons related to the grammar and structure of statutory text. 
He invokes these tools to identify a reading that is sufficiently 
clear so as to disqualify other plausible interpretations.23 An 
implicit assumption in Justice Scalia’s “hard textualist” 
approach is that when these semantic tools establish lack of 
ambiguity, the resultant construction is correct—not simply 
preferred on the basis of shrewd inferences or educated 
guesses.24 The correct construction in turn precludes reference 
to the nonsemantic contextual source of legislative history. 
There are sound reasons why so many judges and scholars do 
not share Justice Scalia’s semantically based confidence, as 
discussed in the sections that follow. 
A. Concerns Regarding the Conclusiveness of Plain Meaning 
Many judges and scholars are not convinced that 
statutory meaning can be regularly rendered singularly correct 
based only on language-related considerations.25 There are, of 
course, the proverbial easy cases, but the majority of those are 
not litigated to the circuit court level, much less accorded 
discretionary review by the Supreme Court. When statutory 
  
 23 See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 224-34 (1994); 
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251-63 (1993); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. 
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86-92, 97-99 (1991). 
 24 Cf. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for disregarding well-settled principles of statutory 
construction by pronouncing “a seemingly clear provision . . . ‘ambiguous’ sans textual 
and structural analysis”). 
 25 See generally JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION 
AND REGULATION 111-12, 232-33 (2010) (discussing lack of agreement among judges 
and scholars regarding what exactly qualifies as unambiguous text and which 
ambiguity-resolving tools ought to be given priority). 
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disputes reach the Court, the justices often regard the 
contested text as allowing for two distinct yet plausible plain 
meanings. Some justices may insist that the language is so 
clear it can only be read one way, while others point to a 
comparably tenable alternative reading of the same language—
adding that their assertion of plain meaning is supported or 
confirmed by accompanying legislative history.26 
The existence of more than one plausible plain meaning 
for contested text is a function of several factors. On a semantic 
level, Lawrence Solan has pointed to the tension between a 
word’s ordinary usage, which is what it prototypically signifies, 
and a word’s definitional usage, which includes a broader range 
of options.27 Because members of Congress may well have both 
prototypical and definitional aspects in mind, judges cannot 
readily “assume that any instance of a statutory word that 
strays from the prototype is necessarily outside a statute’s 
scope.”28 Prior to 1980, the justices often relied on 
straightforward introspection to discover ordinary meaning.29 
Since Justice Scalia’s arrival, however, the Court tends to 
identify ordinary meaning by invoking multiple specific 
resources, including dictionaries as well as similar language 
from the same or other statutes.30 This expansion of sources has 
led to increased divisiveness, particularly when the justices 
  
 26 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111-19, 133-40 
(2001) (Justices Kennedy and Souter advance competing semantic readings of “engaged 
in interstate commerce,” and Souter invokes legislative history for additional support); 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-87, 495-501 (1999) (Justices 
O’Connor and Stevens advance competing semantic readings of “physical or mental 
impairment,” and Stevens invokes legislative history for additional support); Mertens, 
508 U.S. at 255-59, 263-73 (Justices Scalia and White advance competing semantic 
readings of “equitable relief,” and White invokes legislative history for additional 
support); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 623-29, 633-39 (1982) (Justices White and 
O’Connor advance competing semantic readings of “records compiled for law 
enforcement purposes,” and White invokes legislative history for additional support). 
 27 See Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 2027, 2042-46 (2005). Justice Scalia has shown sensitivity to this distinction at 
times as well. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (“The Court 
does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word can be used and how it 
ordinarily is used.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 28 Solan, supra note 27, at 2046. See, e.g., Smith, 508 U.S. at 228-33, 241-44 
(presenting disagreement over prototypical versus definitional meaning of “use”); 
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 395-402, 410-13 (1991) (presenting disagreement over 
prototypical versus definitional meaning of “representative”). 
 29 See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Mount Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330-
31 (1978); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-74 (1978); Burns v. Alcala, 420 
U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975). 
 30 See Solan, supra note 27, at 2054-55 (reporting on 122 cases since 1817 
that relied on the ordinary meaning rule, including forty-seven decided since 1980). 
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engage in recurrent dictionary wars over what constitutes 
ordinary meaning.31 
Another source of disagreement about plain meaning stems 
from the indefinite nature of important statutory terms. Congress’s 
use of words like “reasonable,” “recognized,” “interfere,” “restrain,” 
or “modify”32 reflects its interest in flexibility, anticipating that 
citizens, agencies, and courts will adapt a statute’s application in 
light of altered or novel circumstances. This in turn raises the 
possibility that a prototypical or definitional meaning may give rise 
to plausible conflicting applications when the word is considered in 
its statutory setting. To take one example, the Federal 
Communications Commission Act authorizes the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to “modify” any tariff-filing 
requirement; the issue in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT & 
T Co.33 was whether the commission’s decision to make tariff filing 
optional for nondominant long distance carriers was a valid 
exercise of this authority. Assuming that the plain meaning of 
“modify” is minor or incremental change, as opposed to change that 
is more basic or important,34 a court still must decide whether the 
FCC’s detariffing initiative reflects a minor or major shift in its 
requirements. This choice in turn implicates two competing 
readings of the policies underlying Congress’s rate-filing 
requirement.35  
Apart from divergent understandings as to what 
constitutes the plain meaning of a statutory term or phrase, 
  
 31 See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998); MCI Telecomms. 
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994). See generally Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. 
Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use 
of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999) (demonstrating subjective and highly 
variable use of dictionaries); see also William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in 
Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 234-40 (2000) (contending that reliance 
on use of same term in other statutes is prone to judicial manipulation). 
 32 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006) (authorizing award of reasonable 
attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases); 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006) 
(requiring employers to provide a place of employment “free from recognized hazards” 
that are likely to result in death or serious physical harm); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006) 
(prohibiting employers from interfering with or restraining employees in the exercise of 
rights to engage in concerted activities such as organizing and collective bargaining); 
47 U.S.C. § 203(b) (2006) (authorizing Federal Communications Commission to modify 
tariff-filing requirements for communications common carriers). 
 33 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
 34 But cf. id. at 225-28, 240-42 (presenting disagreement between Justices 
Scalia and Stevens as to whether definition of “modify” covers only minor shift from 
status quo ante or also applies to more substantial adjustment). 
 35 See id. at 229-34, 242-45 (presenting disagreement between Justices Scalia 
and Stevens over whether change in rate-filing requirement should be considered 
against backdrop of carriers’ obligations to file (a major shift) or against backdrop of 
policies behind rate-filing requirements (a minor shift)). 
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based on semantic or policy considerations, judges also differ in 
doctrinal terms about how to construct plain meaning as a 
predicate for judicial review. These differences—often framed 
as disagreements over identifying and weighing the factors 
that contribute to ambiguity—further complicate the task of 
determining a single plain meaning. Thus, for instance, when 
the Court considers the correct application of the Rule of Lenity 
to criminal statutes, some justices contend that a statutory 
term or phrase is not clear unless the government uses “text, 
structure, and history . . . to establish that [its] position is 
unambiguously correct.”36 Others maintain that a text is clear 
for Lenity purposes unless it suffers from “grievous ambiguity 
or uncertainty,” meaning that—based on text, structure, and 
history—the Court can make “no more than a guess as to what 
Congress intended.”37 Similarly, when deciding whether 
Congress has directly and clearly addressed an issue for 
purposes of applying stage one of the Chevron test, the justices 
disagree as to whether legislative history may be considered 
along with text and structure in order to ascertain clarity.38 
Finally, those who interpret or apply statutory text 
bring to the interpretive enterprise both individual specialized 
backgrounds and distinctive degrees of self-assurance. 
Government bureaucrats who receive formal training or 
extensive ad hoc instruction in the intricacies of a complex 
statutory scheme may believe they have little discretion 
because the meaning of key terms or phrases seems entirely 
clear to them, even if ordinary citizens might not perceive the 
same clarity.39 Similarly, judges rely on a range of “objective” 
interpretive assets as part of their effort to avoid charges of 
subjective decision making; framing judicial decisions as 
“inevitable” promotes the vision of a coherent and continuous 
  
 36 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also United 
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.); United States v. Bass, 404 
U.S. 336, 347-49 (1971) (Marshall, J.). 
 37 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138-39 (Breyer, J.) (internal citations omitted); see 
also United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 38 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-37, 441-49 (1987) (Stevens, J.); 
id. at 452-54 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 39 See Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1299, 1328-33 (1997) (discussing different mechanisms used by German and American 
bank regulators and the inclination of many regulators to deny that they are exercising 
discretion when applying statutory text). 
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body of law.40 Although some judges candidly acknowledge that 
interpreting statutes involves an irreducible element of 
discretion or even intuition,41 they express varying degrees of 
confidence in the inevitable correctness of justifications 
accompanying their holdings. Thus, Justice Scalia is famously 
bullish about being able to find the single right answer in text 
alone.42 By contrast, Justice Ginsburg looks to legislative 
history to help complete her interpretive task, albeit with an 
attitude of “hopeful skepticism.”43 And Justice Breyer, whose 
background includes experience as a Senate committee counsel, 
believes courts must never abandon the effort of seeking to 
identify legislative intent even though that effort can be at 
times quite arduous.44 
Underlying these divergent perspectives about statutory 
language—and the possible impact of policy considerations and 
interpreter backgrounds with respect to such language—is the 
reality that statutes are not disembodied textual products but 
rather are part of a purposive communicative process. Like 
other forms of purposive communication, their meaning is a 
function of participants’ intentions as well as dictionary 
definitions and the semantic properties of sentences.45 Even 
Justice Scalia has been known to invoke the concept of 
congressional intent in some judicial opinions, notwithstanding 
the dismissive approach he adopts in extrajudicial settings.46  
  
 40 See generally Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision 
Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 14-17 (1998); William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 378-79 (1990).  
 41 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 107-08 (2008); Judith S. 
Kaye, The Human Dimension in Appellate Judging: A Brief Reflection on a Timeless 
Concern, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1006-07 (1988); Patricia Wald, Thoughts on 
Decisionmaking, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984). 
 42 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of 
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (1989) (“One who finds more often (as I do) that the 
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other 
laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference 
exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an 
interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.”). 
 43 See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, To Be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
103d Cong. 224 (1993). 
 44 STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 100 (2010). 
 45 See Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from 
Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 961-71 (2007). 
 46 Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 16-17 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997) (rejecting as incompatible with fair or democratic government “to 
have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by 
what the lawgiver promulgated”), with Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 90 (1990) 
(Scalia, J.) (invoking what “Congress had in mind”), Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 
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In contrast to Justice Scalia, however, judges who 
instinctively look beyond plain meaning for reassurance or 
confirmation believe they are engaged in a more complete task 
as interpreters. The search for completeness reflects a sense of 
what many if not most judges regard as a properly responsive 
and responsible role. 
B. Concerns Regarding the Responsible Role of Judges 
From the early days of the Supreme Court, justices have 
observed that when “labour[ing] to discover the design of the 
legislature, [a judge] seizes every thing from which aid can be 
derived.”47 More recently, the Court has explained that in a 
confirmatory setting “common sense suggests that inquiry 
benefits from reviewing additional information rather than 
ignoring it.”48 This judicial instinct to explore all potentially 
relevant information is cross-cultural if not universal. In 
Britain, even when the House of Lords prohibited courts from 
consulting legislative history at all to aid in construing enacted 
laws, there were distinguished jurists who confessed—in their 
opinions and on the floor of Parliament—to peeking at the 
legislative record evidence in search of further enlightenment.49 
The quest for completeness when interpreting 
presumptively clear text is in part a search for reassurance. 
There is a lingering fear that in exceptional circumstances, “the 
literal application of a statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters . . . . [or 
will] thwart the obvious purpose of the statute.”50 Judges are 
prepared to examine and evaluate all available resources in an 
effort to avoid error or injustice. 
  
490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same), and Holloway v. United States, 
526 U.S. 1, 20 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (critical of majority decision as promoting a 
result “so arbitrary that it is difficult to believe Congress intended it”). See generally 
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 
102-04 (2010) (discussing Justice Scalia’s use of intentionalist talk in his opinions).  
 47 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.). 
 48 Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611-12 n.4 (1991) (White, 
J.,), cited with approval in Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2287 n.9 (2010). 
 49 See James J. Brudney, The Story of Pepper v. Hart: Examining Legislative 
History Across the Pond, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 258, 262-63 (William 
N. Eskridge Jr. et al., eds., 2011) (reporting remarks by Lord Denning in a 1979 Court 
of Appeal opinion and by Lord Templeman during a 1989 debate in the House of 
Lords). The House of Lords overruled its precedent in 1992 and has allowed courts to 
consult legislative history since that time. See id. at 271-77.  
 50 Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (Rehnquist, 
J.) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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But the judicial pursuit of confirmatory evidence involves 
more than concern over possible error. Judges are trained and 
socialized to believe in the value of interpreting the law in a 
skillful and impartial manner.51 Bracketing for present purposes 
whether judges also derive satisfaction as interpreters from 
promoting their own policy goals, it seems evident that “judges 
who want the respect of practicing lawyers, legal academics, and 
other judges have an incentive to be perceived as committed to 
the law and skilled in its interpretation.”52 
Invoking legislative history in a confirmatory setting is 
likely to enhance a judge’s stature with numerous audiences. 
To begin with, confirmatory discussion may be viewed as an 
aspect of judicial accountability. The parties and their 
attorneys—who may not agree with one another on the clarity 
of text—present legislative-history arguments in an effort to 
inform and persuade the court. When courts consider these 
arguments as part of the written decision-making process, they 
exhibit respect for attorneys’ efforts and in doing so attest to 
the procedural neutrality of our judicial system. Judges who 
cite legislative history in confirmatory contexts also express—
at least implicitly—that the parties’ arguments appropriately 
contribute to the truth-seeking approach underlying our 
competitive advocacy process.  
In addition, consideration of confirmatory legislative 
record evidence promotes transparency by making it clear to 
fellow judges and other attorneys that the court has not ignored 
or suppressed assertedly relevant interpretive factors. Without a 
willingness to engage legislative history arguments, even in the 
face of apparently clear text, judges risk sliding into more 
conclusory and less deliberative thinking on appropriately 
contested statutory matters.53 Justice Scalia belittles this quest 
for completeness,54 but others embrace it to signal that judges 
are acting responsibly by illuminating all plausible arguments 
as an essential aspect of their reasoned decision making.  
Further, the courts’ commitment to addressing 
legislative history as a confirmatory asset provides guidance to 
repeat litigants, notably the executive branch and interest 
  
 51 See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 54 (2006). 
 52 Id. at 106. 
 53 See generally Ethan J. Lieb & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in 
Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47 (2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/ 
images/pdfs/900.pdf. 
 54 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
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groups that pursue or resist diverse regulatory agendas. It does 
so by more fully integrating legislative history as a resource in 
ongoing interpretive conversations between courts and these 
repeat players. This kind of methodological completeness has 
special value when one recognizes that legislative history may 
serve distinct functions with respect to different subject areas 
addressed by Congress. The executive branch must construe 
and apply statutes that feature, inter alia, varying degrees of 
semantic detail, technical complexity, ideological compromise, 
and potential for constitutional controversy.55 Courts’ review 
and evaluation of confirmatory history in these settings reflect 
a willingness to help agencies and other regular litigants 
navigate the diverse challenges they face when implementing 
Congress’s instructions. 
Finally, the courts’ use of legislative-record evidence for 
confirmatory purposes respects the role of Congress in the 
lawmaking process. Justice Scalia’s fear that this practice 
incentivizes legislators to avoid the hard work of passing clear 
text rests on a key misunderstanding of why legislative history 
matters. Reports from permanent standing committees and 
published verbatim records of floor debates are the result of 
innovations in legislative design that were authorized under 
Article I of our Constitution.56 From the early nineteenth 
century onward, Congress has expanded its record-keeping 
requirements as it developed more detailed procedures for 
keeping itself informed during the lengthy and complex 
processes by which bills are introduced, discussed, modified, 
and approved.57 Members’ reliance on legislative history in 
helping them understand the meaning of the text on which 
they will vote remains robust today.58 
  
 55 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory 
Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 
58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1260-65, 1276-90 (2009) (differentiating between how legislative 
history educates and persuades members of Congress in tax legislation versus 
workplace laws, and how the Supreme Court has grasped and applied the distinctions); 
Lieb & Serota, supra note 53, at 54-55 (discussing more restricted role for imputed 
intent with respect to criminal law legislative history). 
 56 See James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political 
Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1217-22 (2010) (discussing early 
congressional commitment to publication over secrecy, and to organizing legislative 
production through standing committees rather than select committees). 
 57 See id. (describing move to daily official publication of full floor proceedings 
and regular internal distribution of standing committee reports, and explaining that 
documents were produced for benefit of members themselves as well as broader public).  
 58 See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 1292 & n.249 (referring to 
multiple statements from republican and democratic legislators since the late 1980s). 
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Given this constitutionally and historically grounded 
tradition, courts’ consultation of legislative history to confirm 
textual meaning signifies their readiness to invoke the same 
materials that legislators have long used to inform and 
persuade one another. Members and their staffs know the 
difference between enacted text and explanatory colloquies; 
further, they generally can be expected to know when these 
colloquies exist primarily to clarify or amplify meaning rather 
than to paper over disagreements. While there will be 
anecdotal instances of legislative history being planted in an 
effort to assuage wavering legislators or to sway gullible 
judges, such instances are anecdotal and also readily 
detectable.59 Justice Scalia’s belief that invoking confirmatory 
legislative history will effectively invite members to excuse or 
conceal failures to reach a textual bargain reflects insufficient 
appreciation for how Congress operates and has operated for 
nearly two centuries.60 
CONCLUSION 
This essay has explored the link between judges’ use of 
legislative history for confirmatory purposes and certain limits 
on how much work language alone can do in statutory 
interpretation. Over the past quarter century, Justice Scalia 
has played a formidable role in elevating discourse on the 
importance of close textual analysis and the related utility of 
language and structural canons. His contributions and 
thinking have greatly enriched our understanding of the 
interpretive enterprise, from a pragmatic and constitutional as 
well as a semantic standpoint. At the same time, by framing 
the debate over legislative history in terms of admissibility 
rather than weight, Scalia and other textualists have shaped 
  
 59 See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1994); see also 
James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: 
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 47-56 (1994) (rejecting arguments 
for systemically discounting legislative history based on asserted manipulation by 
committee staff or unrepresentative character of standing committees). 
 60 Relatedly, this argument also undervalues the role of purposive or 
intentionalist readings of statutes in allowing voters to understand and respond at the 
ballot box to the lawmaking results Congress meant to put in place. As Justice Breyer 
has recently explained, when courts use canons, dictionaries, and grammar arguments 
alone to determine a statute’s scope, meaning, or enforcement impact, it is far more 
likely that voters will be responding to (and passing judgment on) meanings that 
Congress never dreamed it was enacting—one result being a more flawed operation of 
democratic accountability. See BREYER, supra note 44, at 94-96. 
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an interpretive conversation that too often has been 
impoverished in its nature and focus.  
During the mid 1980s, then-Judge Scalia invoked the 
British “exclusionary rule” to help justify his emergent position 
of rejecting any role for legislative history.61 The British courts, 
however, have long abandoned the exclusionary approach; 
instead, they recognize that legislative history statements are 
at times useful as an interpretive resource, “perhaps especially 
as a confirmatory aid.”62 British judges and legal academics now 
grapple with the extent to which their legislative history may 
illuminate the meaning of enacted text in particular types of 
complex statutory settings.63 Similar challenging questions of 
retail application rather than wholesale exclusion remain to be 
explored in the U.S. context as well.64 Recognizing why judges 
so often turn to legislative history for reinforcement and 
assurance may encourage us to move beyond debates over 
admissibility, and to address these types of interpretive 
challenges at both judicial and academic levels. 
  
 61 See Judge Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History 1-2 (delivered 
between fall 1985 and spring 1986 at various law schools) (transcript on file with author). 
 62 Harding v. Wealands, [2006] UKHL 32, [2006] 4 All. E.R. 1, 25 (Lord 
Carswell). For discussion of other recent confirmatory uses by Britain’s highest court, 
see Brudney, supra note 49, at 284.  
 63 See, e.g., Wilson v. First Cnty. Trust Ltd., [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All 
E.R. 97 (discussing consultation of Hansard materials to help determine a statute’s 
compatibility with European Convention of Human Rights); Regina v. Sec’y of State for 
the Env’t ex parte Spath Holme Ltd., [2001] 1 All E.R. 195 (discussing relevance of 
Hansard materials when considering scope of government’s discretionary powers 
conferred by statute). 
 64 In addition to the differential role played by legislative history in different 
subject area settings, discussed supra note 55 and accompanying text, courts and 
scholars might consider (a) whether legislative history accompanying omnibus bills is 
less suitable for judicial use because congressional deals on such a grand scale are far 
more likely to be indecipherable; (b) whether legislative history should be presumed to 
carry less weight where the law is administered primarily by a federal agency rather 
than private parties; and (c) whether legislative history should be regarded as 
presumptively more valuable for controversies involving apparent lack of foresight as 
opposed to those arising from demonstrable failure to reach congressional consensus. 
